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Abstract: 
Purpose: This is a research paper that develops a novel approach to understand North 
Korea’s nuclear policy on the basis of conflict transformation theory.  
Design, Methodology, Approach: By conceptualising the situation on the Korean peninsula as 
a protracted conflict (either between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea or North Korea 
and the United States), new insights into the nature of the protracted cycle of engagement and 
conflict with North Korea can be developed. In this context, the role and trajectory of the 
nuclear programme can be analysed and both the failure of and the need for arms control 
negotiations understood.  
Findings: The paper shows that using conflict transformation theory provides an analytically 
coherent explanation of North Korean security policy and foreign policy behaviour that fits 
the empirical evidence more closely than alternative approaches. 
Practical Implications: The paper assesses the current policy of “strategic patience” vis-à-vis 
North Korea and demonstrates how it is based on false assumptions and involves risks that 
need to be addressed by the United States and the international community. 
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Originality. Value: This paper presents a novel approach to analysing the puzzle of North 
Korean foreign policy behaviour with important implications for understanding the nature of 
the conflict and possible conditions for its resolution 
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Since the end of the Cold War, the North Korean regime has faced extraordinary challenges 
as the economy of the country collapsed, it experienced a major famine in which well over 
one million of its citizens perished and it has been in a major confrontation with the world’s 
only superpower over its nuclear weapons program. Contrary to the expectations, the North 
Korean regime has survived in power, recently passing on the mantle of leadership to the 
third generation. Nevertheless, the expectation that this cannot continue forever persists, and 
recently President Obama declared his belief in the inevitability of North Korea’s collapse.1 
 North Korea has been at the nexus of North East Asian security for over six decades. 
Since the end of the Cold War, this has focussed on three distinct but interrelated regional 
security issues: (1) North Korea as a source of regional instability in view of the military 
confrontation on the Korean peninsula, (2) North Korea’s nuclear programme and its 
activities as a proliferator of nuclear and ballistic missile technology at a time when nuclear 
proliferation is increasingly seen as one of the key global security issues, (3) the role of the 
Korean peninsula in the emerging geopolitics of North East Asia.  
 This paper approaches the subject from the point of view of theoretical approaches to 
protracted conflicts. By conceptualising the situation on the Korean peninsula as a protracted 
conflict (either between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea or North Korea and the United 
States), new insights into the nature of the protracted cycle of engagement and conflict with 
North Korea can be developed. In this context, the role and trajectory of the nuclear 
programme can be analysed and both the failure of and the need for arms control negotiations 
understood. The paper will assess the current policy of “strategic patience” vis-à-vis North 
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Korea and demonstrate how it is based on false assumptions and involves risks that need to 
be addressed by the United States and the international community. 
 
Understanding North Korea’s diplomacy 
North Korean foreign policy has seemed confusing and Pyongyang’s intentions have been 
subject to controversy and different interpretations.2 But contrary to the impression of strange 
and erratic behaviour, given the situation they find themselves in, there is a clear logic in the 
policies they pursue.3 During the Cold War period, the confrontation on the Korean peninsula 
was embedded in the East-West confrontation. Both Koreas were kept secure and at the same 
time restrained by their respective superpower allies. For North Korea the geopolitical 
situation was somewhat more complex than for the South, because Kim Il-sung did not 
accept Soviet dominance such as was exercised in parts of Eastern Europe. Consequently he 
pursued a policy of equidistance between China and the Soviet Union.4 At the same time he 
gradually built up North Korea’s military capabilities with a view to achieving unification 
under his leadership when the time would be ripe. Since the end of the Cold War and the loss 
of economic support and reliable security guarantees from its erstwhile sponsors, the top 
priority for North Korea has been regime survival. The Kim regime feels threatened by the 
changed geopolitical environment and in particular what it calls the ‘hostile policy’ of the 
United States, and its severe economic difficulties. 
 
The US concern with North Korea’s nuclear programme provided Pyongyang with the 
opportunity to engage the United States.5 This engagement came to be perceived in 
Pyongyang as the key for addressing the external security concerns and the economic 
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predicament of the DPRK. Essentially North Korea wants the US to accept the legitimacy of 
the regime, normalize diplomatic relations, take concrete steps to end the military threat to 
North Korea, such as sign a non-aggression pact, and remove economic sanctions. It is 
important to not only understand the motivations that drive North Korean foreign policy, but 
also the tactics. Just as the United States uses coercive measures (such as unilateral and 
multilateral sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions) as well as incentives (the 
provision of fuel, the lifting of sanctions, diplomatic visits), North Korea uses its own form of 
pressure tactics (developing and demonstrating military capabilities, refusing to attend talks, 
issuing verbal threats, abandoning previous agreements) alongside cooperative gestures 
(permitting inspections, implementing parts of previous agreements, attending talks, entering 
into new agreements).  
The concepts of national autonomy and sovereignty play a key role in North Korean 
diplomacy.6  The application of international law, external inspections or the verification of 
agreements are seen as being in fundamental contradiction to these principles. The launch of 
a Taepodong-2 rocket on 5 April 2009 to put a satellite into orbit is a good example. It was 
clearly designed to demonstrate North Korea’s missile capabilities and defiance of UNSCR 
1718. It was a way for the Kim regime to demonstrate that it was standing up for its 
sovereign rights and was not cowed by international reaction. 7  The same principles apply to 
the two launches of the Unha-3 in 2012. It is clear from the history of US-DPRK negotiations 
that diplomats are often under pressure to prove that they are standing up to the demands of 
the United States. This can mean that they become too inflexible and lose sight of the larger 
objectives and fail to obtain the results that they are seeking. The experience of dealing with 
North Korea also leads to the conclusion that the demands of the military can thwart 
negotiations which otherwise would have resulted in favourable agreements.8 The so-called 
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“leap day” agreement of 29 February 2012, according to which the DPRK would suspend 
uranium enrichment and nuclear testing as well as permit IAEA inspectors to monitor 
acitivites at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities in return for food aid and improved relations with 
the US failed because the military leadership insisted on a missile launch to celebrate the 
100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung.9 This decision was taken even though the 
Americans made it clear that this launch would result in the cancellation of the Leap Day 
Agreement. 
The decision to produce a nuclear device and conduct a nuclear test was taken in 2003 
after the 11th round of the Supreme People’s Assembly in September 2003. A decisive factor 
was the Iraq war, which seemed to demonstrate the need for a capacity to deter a US attack. 10  
The belief of the North Korean elite that the nuclear programme enhances the status of the 
DPRK, provides deterrence against external aggression and facilitates a security dialogue 
with the United States that enables North Korea also to obtain much needed economic 
support is deeply engrained. North Korea has been willing to freeze and limit its nuclear 
programme, but the leaders in Pyongyang have never yet reached the point where they will 
finally give it up, and it is difficult to conceive any circumstances under which this might 
happen. Even if the various demands were met and the US established diplomatic relations, 
signed a non-aggression pact and followed through with other promises about ‘changing its 
hostile policy’, this would not be enough to permanently guarantee North Korea’s security.  
 
On the other hand the external threat to North Korea is primarily created by the nuclear 
programme in the first place. There is a curious paradox that underlies North Korean foreign 
policy, which is that it is fundamentally predicated on making North Korea appear dangerous 
to the international community. This motivates the United States and other countries to 
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engage with North Korea in order to mitigate the threat, but in order for this to be sustained 
the threat has to be periodically revived. This creates the seemingly inescapable cycle of 
conflict and cooperation. It also accounts for North Korea’s diplomacy which to outsiders 
sometimes appears erratic and even irrational. 
 
Conceptualising North-South relations as persistent conflict 
International relations scholars have developed several approaches to conceptualize and 
explain persistent and protracted conflicts. Sophisticated approaches have been developed to 
understand enduring rivalries. These are called the punctuated equilibrium and the 
evolutionary model. The punctuated equilibrium model considers disputes and wars in the 
long-range context of the relationship and discerns three phases in the development of a 
rivalry. The first is the on-set phase which is initiated by a political shock, a dramatic change 
such as regime change or a large-scale shift in the international system. The model does not 
elaborate on very specific conditions that bring about the onset of protracted rivalries. The 
conflict becomes protracted if patterns of hostility are locked in which occurs if disputes are 
not resolved relatively quickly. The lock-in phase is followed by “stasis” which is 
characterised by regular and consistent hostile interactions between the protagonists. 
Relations between the two protagonists will fluctuate around a “basic rivalry level” (BRL). 
Phases of crisis or détente a variations around the BRL.  The model allows for quite large 
fluctuations from the equilibrium level (BRL) including wars or lesser crises. A necessary 
(but not always sufficient) condition for this to change and for a protracted rivalry to end is 
another exogenous political shock that causes an abrupt end to the adversarial relationship. In 
the case of North and South Korea, the initial endogenous shock that initiated the rivalry was 
the creation of two Korean states after World War II. These events established a very high 
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“basic rivalry level”, but unlike in other cases where the rivalry was quickly resolved by a 
war this did not happen in this case because the Korean War.  The research by Stinnett and 
Diehl indicates that the likelihood of a dyad of states to develop an enduring rivalry is higher 
if the first confrontation is over a territorial dispute.   According to Tir and Diehl’s work, 81 
per cent of enduring rivalries involve territorial disputes.11 Since 1947 Pakistan and India 
have clashed 44 times, with 86 per cent of the clashes relating to territory. Territorial disputes 
are often hard to resolve because they are zero-sum games and their visibility means that it is 
hard for political leaders to defend any compromise. This is especially the case when the 
territory is linked with the identity of the state. The absence of a solution that fall within the 
“win set” of both parties is a recipe for long-term, militarized competition.   
Evolutionary conceptions of protracted conflicts likewise focus on the initial confrontations 
as a critical factor for the development of the enduring rivalry. If a confrontation ends in a 
negotiated compromise, this could alter the environment of the relationship and enable a 
satisfactory resolution. A stalemate or unclear outcome on the other hand is considered to 
increase distrust and hostility between the two protagonists as the central issues remain 
unresolved. A decisive defeat of one side by the other tends to reduce conflict levels, at least 
in the immediate aftermath. The defeated side will need to recover. It is not necessarily the 
end of conflict because the defeated side might take time to resume the confrontation at a 
more propitious time. 
 Protracted conflicts can be said to have a certain life-cycle that involves four distinct 
phases: The origin of the conflict, intensification (or escalation), de-escalation (relaxation of 
tension) and termination. An extended conflict can go through phases of escalation and de-
escalation repeatedly before it finally terminates. The intensification can involve crises and 
even wars. The end of a war or the end of a crisis does not necessarily mean de-escalation of 
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the conflict itself. The escalation phase can involve various forms of arms races, diplomatic 
confrontations and efforts to build alliances with like-minded states. Scholars make a 
distinction between high, medium or low intensification of protracted conflict. A high degree 
of intensification is characterised by persistent serious crises and confrontations including 
wars. A medium degree of intensification involves crises of lower intensity and medium level 
military action short of a major war. A low degree of intensification is characterised by low 
level military actions such as border skirmishes, bombings, efforts to reduce tension by de-
escalating or terminating crises. 
Protracted conflicts have been identified as the most common source of interstate armed 
conflict. They are different from ordinary security dilemmas in so far as they are not a 
consequence of anarchy in the international system or fluctuations in the distribution of 
power, but more permanent factors related either to unresolved territorial disputes, cultural 
and religious rivalries or ideological factors that question the legitimacy of one of the parties. 
Scholars like Vasquez who have studied protracted conflicts have identified territorial 
conflicts as the most difficult to resolve and the most likely to result in the outbreak of inter-
state wars. As Vasquez stated: “According to the territorial explanation of war, what makes 
territorial disputes so intractable is that concrete tangible territorial stakes, like pieces of land, 
that are in principle divisible, become infused with “symbolic” and even “transcendent” 
qualities that make them intangible, perceived in zero-sum, and hence difficult to divide.” 12 
Territorial disputes which are not resolved even by armed conflict therefore tend to recur and 
in the case of India and Pakistan the first Kashmir was essentially a typical territorial war, 
and all the subsequent military clashes or confrontations have been to a significant part about 
territory as the revisionist power has been unprepared to accept a stalemate or the status quo. 
In the Korean case, the Korean was inconclusive because it ended with the status quo ante 
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more or less, without resolving the Korean issue. According to Vasquez, the “steps to war 
explanation posits that territorial disputes are so salient that they will continue to fester unless 
they are resolved either through an overwhelming victory or through a mutually accepted 
settlement that recognizes the border as legal. The India-Pakistan conflict is so disputatious 
because neither side has been able to attain that overwhelming victory …” A persistent 
conflict that does not move towards resolution but instead is characterised by a cycle of 
escalation, confrontation, crises and de-escalation that does not lead to a resolution but to 
another on-set of escalation according to Khan leads to deterrence becoming the favoured 
approach to containing the conflict and preventing the outbreak of war.13 But conventional 
deterrence is generally considered to be unreliable and for this reason according to Khan 
dyads of countries in a persistent dispute are liable to acquire nuclear weapons. The US-
Soviet relationship, the North Korea – South Korea relationship and South Asia are all 
prominent examples. But there is caveat in so far as in all of these cases the nuclear factor 
was introduced with reference to the persistent conflict. The United States was a nuclear 
power even before the creation of the DPRK and the Republic Korea, the US nuclear 
programme was not initiated because of a conflict with the Soviet Union and India acquired 
nuclear weapons without reference to a threat from Pakistan.  In all of the cases it was the 
other side that acquired nuclear weapons at least partially in response to facing a nuclear 
armed adversary.  
The analytical approach to the study of protracted conflict distinguishes low, medium or high 
intensification phases of the conflict. This is related to the level of hostility and violence. In 
particular if a war breaks the conflict is clearly in a state of high intensification. The core of 
Khan’s argument is that “wars, which represent the high intensification phase, ending with 
winners and losers, may terminate a conflict.”14 
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If we accept the principle that nuclear weapons prevent wars, then this route to de-
escalation and the termination of a conflict may be closed off. In principle, a conventional 
war that results in the destruction of an opposing army could force the termination of a 
conflict. The same does not apply to a nuclear war if both sides have nuclear weapons as the 
level of destruction would be too great for either society to continue to function, In order to 
avoid the devastation of nuclear war it is unlikely to be initiated, according to the principles 
of nuclear deterrence discussed in the previous chapter. As a result the two opposing powers 
have fallen into a trap whereby one of the key instruments of conflict termination has become 
useless. Moreover, a key mechanism to perpetuate the conflict has also become dysfunctional 
and therefore attitudes among the leadership of both sides remain in their previous state, 
pursuing the same zero sum strategy in terms of previously existing objectives even as the 
means of achieving them in the shorter term have been curtailed.  
. It is useful to look at the impact of the nuclearisation on the conflict on the Korean 
peninsula.  The acquisition of nuclear weapons confirmed the existing world view and 
illusions of the political elite in North Korea. For the Kim regime the nuclear tests were the 
final step in defying the international nuclear order imposed by the major powers through the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). North Korea now had to opportunity to demonstrate 
that it had a nuclear capability of its own that could deter the United States and redress the 
imbalance with respect to the Republic of Korea. By relying on the nuclear arsenal as an 
equalizer, the illusion of North Korea as a great regional power, while not having any 
currency outside the DPRK, could be used for internal legitimation.   
If nuclear weapons render war dysfunctional as a political instrument, then that 
evidently raises the question of whether this would be the end of the persistent conflict or 
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whether the opposite might be true, that the persistent conflict endures because there is no 
means to resolve it. Saria Khan asserts: 
“This study argues that all wars – nuclear, conventional and limited-aims – will be avoided 
when states in conflict acquire nuclear weapons…”15 
 Those seeking to explain the risk-taking behaviour in South Asia have used Snyder’s 
concept of the stability/instability paradox according to which a balance at the strategic 
nuclear level means that an imbalance at the conventional level can give rise to instability, 
which then manifests itself in low level armed conflicts or crises. Khan claims that “nuclear 
weapons acquisition generates more crises in the conflict setting because escalation to war is 
unlikely, as the stability/instability theorists believe. The frequent eruption of serious crises in 
the nuclear period in the India-Pakistan conflict demonstrates the value of this line of 
reasoning.” 16 
The application of conflict transformation theory to nuclear states in a persistent conflict 
posits that while the two protagonists no longer go to war with each other, the conflict 
manifests itself in crises. The conflict effectively becomes frozen and the crises never reach a 
point where they induce a resolution of the conflict or the conflict can progress through its 
life-cycle to de-escalation. Instead the competitive development of conventional and nuclear 
capabilities continues in the form of quantitative and technological arms races, which in 
themselves exacerbate the conflict. Direct confrontations continue to occur and the 
protagonists seek to strengthen their position with recourse to war. The confrontations 
assume the form of proxy attacks, terrorism and insurgencies. These are strategies pursued by 
the weaker of the protagonists. The state dissatisfied with the status quo in particular will 
seek to provoke crises in order to advance its strategic objectives.  
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 The theoretical approach developed by Khan on the basis of the conflict 
transformation literature fits the pattern of North Korea and South Korea, where only one 
party (North Korea) has nuclear weapons but the other side is allied with a nuclear weapons 
state. This is a good example because relations between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea 
are marked by a fundamental and persistent conflict that is based on the irreconcilable claim 
of each state that it represents the Korean nation and that the other state must be destroyed 
and its territory occupied. The strategic situation is stable not only because the DPRK is a 
nuclear state and the ROK is protected by a much more powerful nuclear state, but because 
all parties are fully aware of the unacceptable destruction likely to be caused by a major 
conventional war. In a conventional war North Korea could not prevail and the regime would 
have to expect to be destroyed, but given the short distance from the demilitarized zone to the 
South Korean capital Seoul it has the capacity to cause massive casualties with its artillery 
systems and ballistic missiles. As the weaker side, North Korea has continuously provoked 
very serious military crises (short of war) in order to support its diplomatic objectives and in 
particular to extract economic and political concessions from the other parties involved 
(China, Japan, the United States and South Korea). The conflict cannot advance in the cycle 
because a war is not an option. Both North Korea and the United States have used the North 
Korean nuclear weapons programme as a means to move towards de-escalation and achieve a 
status quo in which the security threats would be mitigated on the basis of non-aggression 
and peaceful co-existence. While the conflict moved through a process of de-escalation for a 
number of years while a so-called “Agreed Framework” was negotiated, a cessation of the 
conflict remained out of reach and the agreements reached were abandoned in a new cycle of 
intensification of the conflict that resulted in nuclear tests and the acquisition of nuclear 
devices by North Korea. Although Khan does not actually discuss this example except in 
relation to the problem of non-proliferation, it fits the paradigm quite well and it is one way 
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to account for the continuous cycle of confrontation and engagement (or lowering and raising 
the level of intensity of the confrontation).  
 
Dealing with North Korea: What is to be done? 
The theory of protracted conflicts suggests that as the conflict cannot progress through its 
natural cycle and is essentially frozen as the strategic situation makes war prohibitive, that 
only a major shock would enable a resolution of the situation. Although all the principal 
actors are pinning their hopes on a gradual evolution, the internal and external constraints 
have inhibited such a development. There are several possible scenarios: 
The first is that the internal contradictions of the regime precipitate its collapse. If 
Kim Jong-un were to be seriously challenged in an internal power struggle or even killed, this 
could result in the loss of central authority as different factions in the elite turn on each other. 
The sudden collapse of the North Korean state has potentially catastrophic consequences. 
Millions of refugees may stream into China or South Korea, many of them heavily armed. 
There is also the prospect of severe fighting between various military factions in the event of 
the collapse of central control. It is in the interests of all countries in the region to prevent this 
from happening.  Despite President Obama’s recent statements regarding a collapse of North 
Korea, it is not clear that such a development is likely in the near or medium future. The very 
intense challenges that the regime had to overcome in the 1990s has demonstrated its 
robustness. The ruthlessness with which the third Kim consolidated his leadership has 
emphasized continuity with the previous directions of policy. It is really hard to conceive 
how the North Korean leadership could extract itself from its predicament if it wanted to. In 
other words, it is really hard to conceive how there can be a soft landing. A collapse is not 
likely in the near future, although it cannot be ruled out.  
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 Exogenous shocks are another possibility. If China decided to end its support for the 
Kim regime, such as it is, that would be such a profound shock to the North Korean system 
that it might be compelled to seek a strategic accommodation, although in such a scenario 
again some form of collapse is a distinct possibility. At the present time such a development 
is highly unlikely and as relations between Russia and the West are deteriorating the 
possibility arises that Russia might take China’s place if it comes to that. While this is 
unlikely in the near term, it cannot be precluded in the longer term as China’s foreign policy 
evolves and if there is no significant change in a North Korea that becomes an increasing 
threat to international security with growing nuclear capabilities. The United States and South 
Korea could facilitate such a development by deepening their relations with China and 
providing reassurances to China about the role of a united Korea in the geopolitics in 
Northeast Asia. 
In the light of these realities, it is important to map out the key objectives in diplomacy with 
North Korea.  
The first priority must be to prevent the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula. In 
principle strategic deterrence in Korea is stable. The problem is that the North Korean state is 
not stable and its leaders indulge in military provocations in order to compel changes in 
US/ROK policy or extort economic concessions. Such brinkmanship is associated with a risk 
of while at the same time refusing to be intimidated by threats of war. Two events in 2010 
resulted in a shift of policy in the Republic of Korea that signals an increased risk of 
escalation in the event of further provocations by the North. After the sinking of the South 
Korea frigate Cheonan on 26 March 2010 and the subsequent investigation which concluded 
it was sunk by North Korean torpedoes and the shelling of the island of Yeonpyeong on 23 
November 2010 the Lee Myung-bak government resolved to counter future such 
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provocations with more significant military counterstrikes which could include targets in 
Pyongyang.17  As a result the risk of uncontrolled escalation in this highly militarised 
environment has increased very significantly, to the extent that policymakers in Washington 
have become fearful of being entrapped in a conflict on the Korean peninsula.  
Although a sudden collapse of the Pyongyang regime is in nobody’s interest, it must 
be a foreign policy goal to weaken the hold of the regime over its people in the long run and 
promote Korean unification. Focussing economic support for North Korea on the needs of the 
population rather than the regime (i.e. food aid in particular) and finding ways of allowing 
more information about the outside world to seep into North Korea will be elements of such a 
strategy. 
 
The trajectory of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs 
After the failure of two major arms control agreements with North Korea, the Obama 
administration has followed a policy based on “strategic patience”. It is based on the principle 
that the US will not engage in arms control with North Korea unless the DPRK returns to the 
13 February agreement (2007) with a view to work towards total nuclear disarmament. While 
the disappointments of previous efforts to engage North Korea might make this policy look 
attractive, there are significant dangers associated with it. First of all there are no longer any 
constraints on the nuclear program and the development of ballistic missiles. If North Korea 
restores the facilities at Yongbyon (as it now appears to have done) and completes the 
construction of the 50 MW(e) and the 200 MW(e) reactors, it will be able to produce 
significant stockpiles of plutonium. At the same time North Korea is known to have built at 
least one facility for enriching uranium. There is a widespread belief among policymakers 
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and analysts that North Korea has the capacity to build uranium-based nuclear devices. The 
common expectation that the nuclear test that was carried out on 12 February 2013 would be 
of a device based on HEU could not be confirmed by an analysis of the measurements 
performed. The North Koreans themselves did not confirm either way, but claimed that the 
test used a “miniaturized lighter nuclear device with greater explosive force”, a statement that 
played right into American and South Korean concerns but again was not verified.18 The 
same applies to the nuclear test carried out on 7 February 2016 which North Korea claimed 
was a hydrogen bomb test without any evidence, a claim that met with universal scepticism 
among experts.19 All of the available evidence suggests that despite its rhetoric North Korea’s 
progress in the development of nuclear devices and the accumulation of fissile material since 
2008 has been quite modest. But the longer there is no progress in arms control, the greater is 
the likelihood that this will change quite dramatically and North Korea will make both the 
engineering breakthroughs and accumulate sufficient fissile material for a significant 
operational force of nuclear weapons.  
Moreover, there is a possibility that North Korea will develop a ballistic missile of 
true intercontinental range, capable of reaching the continental United States.  As with 
nuclear devices, the extent of North Korean capabilities is ambiguous. By 1991 the entire 
Korean peninsula was within the range of North Korean missiles based on Soviet Scud 
technology, but the efforts to extend the range of the Scud had reached their limits. In the late 
1980s North Korea began the development of a medium range that would have the capability 
to target Japan, with a range of 1,000 – 1,300 km and a payload of 700-1000 kg. This missile 
called the Rodong was based on a design that required different engines and guidance 
systems to achieve the required performance characteristics. The concept design for it was 
developed by the Makeyev OKB in the Soviet Union (a design bureau that specializes in 
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submarine launched missiles) and consequently this missile bears some resemblance to the 
early designs of the SS-N-4 (R-13) and SS-N-5 (R21). The engine for the Nodong seems to 
be of similar design as the Isayev S-2.713M engine incorporated in the SS-N-4 and the 
missile itself an intermediate design between the SS-N-4 and SS-N-5. Although the 
contribution of ex-Soviet missile engineers cannot be positively determined, it is known that 
60 engineers from the Makeyev OKB were prevented from flying to North Korea in October 
1992. Some reports say eventually some Russian engineers made it to the DPRK and others 
collaborated with North Korean engineers by email.20 The scale of the North Korean missile 
program which developed different missile types within a comparatively short time frame 
makes it appear implausible that North Korea could have achieved such a feat which would 
have strained the capacity of countries which a far more highly developed industrial base 
without a substantial transfer of technology. A North Korean defector claimed that 90% of the 
components of a factory producing missile guidance and control systems were imported from 
Japan.21 While the DPRK may now have become self-sufficient in the capacity to produce 
airframes, tanks and other important missile components, it may still be reliant on imports for 
advanced electronic components. Some analysts have become convinced that North Korea’s 
missile programme is not really indigenous or self-sufficient in any sense, but is more 
accurately described as procurement. Thus Daniel A. Pinkston from Troy University and 
Robert Schmucker, a former UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) inspector in 
Iraq have pointed out that the DPRK missile programme is characterized by short 
development timelines, few flight tests and early production schedules.22 North Korea also 
has a medium-range missile called the Musudan (also Hwasong-10). It is suggested that it is 
based on the engine of an SS-N-6 (R-27) with a Rodong re-entry vehicle and interstage 
element, thus resulting in a missile body with a diameter of 1.5 m (equal to that of the SS-N-
6) but somewhat greater length than the original Soviet missile (12 m as opposed to 9.65 
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m).23 If the estimates for the range of the missile are correct, then it could target American 
bases in Okinawa and Guam. The development of the Musudan began in 1992 when the 
general designer of the Makeyev Design Bureaux, Igor Velichko, signed a $3 million contract 
with the Korea Yeongwang Trading Company. The contract was for Russian professors to 
teach in North Korea, but in fact was said to have involved the development of a space 
vehicle designated ‘Zyb’ (a reference to the R-27/SS-N-6).24 The Musudan was tested several 
times in 2016 and North Korea claimed that it could target Guam although experts believe 
that would require a low weight warhead, precluding a nuclear payload.25 The other missile 
of note is the KN-02 which is based on the SS-21 (Tochka) and which was first publicly 
displayed on 25 April 2007. It is believed that the SS-21 was procured from Syria together 
with solid propellant. The missiles which Syria originally acquired from the Soviet Union 
were shipped from Syria to North Korea in August 1996.26 
North Korea’s long-range missiles are based on the Taepodong/Paektusan series. The 
Taepodong I was a three-stage missile intended to launch a satellite into orbit in 1998. It 
failed but as the trajectory of the missile passed over Japan the launch created considerable 
tension. Current efforts to develop space launch vehicles and intercontinental range missiles 
focus on the follow-on system, the Taepodong 2/Paektusan 2.  The Unha series of space 
launch vehicles is believed to be a further development of that system. The first launch of the 
Taepodong 2 in 2006 was a complete failure. On 5 April 2009 the Unha-2 failed to launch the 
satellite but demonstrated the viability of the first two stages. In response to the launch the 
UN Security Council, with China’s support, passed resolution 1874 reprimanding North 
Korea for the nuclear and missile tests.27 It imposed new sanctions, expands arms embargos, 
and authorized ship searches on the high seas, thus breathing new life into the Proliferation 
Security Initiative as South Korea finally decided to join.28  On 13 April 2012 a launch of an 
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Unha-3 failed, but another launch on 12 December 2012 succeeded in launching a satellite 
into orbit. Analysts believe that the Unha-3’s first stage is a cluster Nodong engines, and the 
second stage is a Nodong engine with additional fuel tanks. The third stage is believed to be a 
modified version of the second stage of the Iranian Safir missile, suitable for launching a 
satellite but not adequate as the third stage of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). 
North Korea has displayed a missile known as the KN-08 on parades but there is no evidence 
that it is anything more than a mock-up. There is a consensus among experts that North 
Korea is working to develop an ICBM, and that it has not yet mastered this technology.29 In 
particular, there is no evidence that North Korea has been able to develop more advanced 
rocket engines for this purpose. Quite to the contrary, some experts believe that all the 
engines used for the Nodong and other missiles using these engines are not manufactured 
North Korea at all, but imported from Russia. If this is the case then there are severe 
constraints on the further development of North Korean missile capabilities. However, given 
the steady progress North Korea has made over the decades, the prospects that eventually 
North Korea will acquire a true intercontinental ballistic missile capability cannot be 
excluded.  
 
Ending the crisis on the Korean peninsula 
Presidents Obama and Lee Myung-bak at their summit in Washington on 16 June 2009 
emphasized the threat posed by North Korean’s nuclear programme and Obama vowed to 
break the cycle of allowing North Korea to create a crisis to reap further rewards. But it is 
unclear what means are proposed to deal with North Korea from now on. Not only is there no 
clear concept of how North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is to be eliminated, but the focus remains 
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on the nuclear question rather than the regime itself, thus perpetuating the contradictions of 
previous policies.   
In 2011 Park Geun-hye, who was elected to the presidency in December 2012, 
decided to formally lay out her vision for the future of the Korean peninsula and her plan of 
how to deal with North Korea in an article published in the September issue of the American 
journal Foreign Affairs.30 Her analysis of the situation was stark and she pulled no punches 
about North Korea’s aggressive behaviour in the past. At the same time she put forward a 
bold plan to address the situation by embarking on a process building trust among the states 
of the Northeast Asian regions, involving slowing the growth of military build-ups and 
greater economic cooperation. Coining the new phrase “trustpolitik”, she outlined a new 
mechanism to bring “Pyongyang into the fold”.  Park considered that the efforts to engage 
North Korea by means of a “sunshine policy” have failed to mitigate North Korea’s 
aggressive behaviour. By way of an indirect criticism of the incumbent President Lee Myung-
bak, she stated that the policies of conditional engagement and deterrence have likewise 
failed to modify North Korea’s “bellicose strategy towards the South” in a meaningful way. 
She acknowledged that the strategy of conditional engagement that involved the promise of 
very significant levels of economic support in return for North Korean “good behaviour” and 
in particular a resolution of the nuclear issue has failed. In place of the existing policy 
towards North Korea, Park proposed an “alignment policy” that combines toughness with 
flexibility in inner-Korean relations, which should be designed to build trust in alignment 
with international efforts to strengthen security and cooperation. Alongside a vigorous 
posture of deterrence against North Korean provocations, South Korea should offer 
Pyongyang a new beginning, with joint projects of enhanced co-operation, humanitarian 
assistance and new trade and investment opportunities.  
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The efforts by President Park to put her ideas into practice were stymied from the beginning 
due to the provocative behavior by North Korea which consisted of an escalation of tension 
resulting in the temporary closure of the Gaesong Industrial Complex. Considerable 
diplomatic energy was expended in managing the reduction in tension and no major 
initiatives to reorient North-South relations was undertaken, partly because the political space 
was lacking as the Kim regime went through internal turmoil as manifested in the purge and 
execution of Jang Song-thaek. The most significant diplomatic efforts by the Park 
administration were directed at consolidating relations with the United States and China. 
There was also the articulation of a new policy on Korea unification. With the slogan 
“unification bonanza”, the Park administration sought to address domestic anxieties about the 
potential costs of Korean unification. But the effect was to alienate itself even further from 
the North Korean regime because the clear assumption was that unification would not be 
possible as long as the current regime was in power in North Korea. As the Park 
administration approaches its lame duck period, “trustpolitik” has been all but abandoned. 
The final closure of the Gaesong Industrial Complex in 2016 marked a shift towards 
containment was the dominant mode of South Korean policy towards the North.  
 
Conclusion 
Using theoretical approaches to the study of persistent conflicts, it becomes apparent that the 
strategy of patience, like previous approaches to dealing with the nuclear program, is based 
on false assumptions. North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have become fundamental to its 
pursuit of the persistent conflict. Until there is a fundamental change in relations between 
North Korea and South Korea, this conflict remains frozen in its current cycle. This does not 
mean it is not possible to engage in period partial de-escalation. More importantly, while 
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arms control cannot under current circumstances eliminate the nuclear program, it could 
constrain developments that would fundamentally alter the strategic situation. This is why the 
United States and South Korea should continue to engage with North Korea and consider 
ways of returning to arms control negotiations.  
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